Introduction
An important issue in the design of fiscal policy is the substitutability between government and private consumption. If the private sector derives utility from government-provided goods and services and regards private and government consumption as close substitutes, an increase in government consumption will be offset by a corresponding decrease in private consumption, rendering the size of the fiscal multiplier relatively small and even potentially negative. On the other hand, if private and government consumption are complements, an expansionary fiscal policy will be relatively effective in stimulating aggregate demand as private consumption will reinforce the initial fiscal impulse. While it is easy to give examples of individual private and government goods that are substitutes or complements, it is an empirical question whether aggregate private and government consumption are substitutes or complements for a particular economy during a certain period. The purpose of this chapter is to empirically study the substitutability issue for nine East Asian countries-the four northeast countries: China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea, and the five southeast countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Traditional macroeconomic models assume that government consumption works through its impact on private consumption through wealth
The Empirical Model
The empirical work in this paper centers around a cointegrating regression that relates the logarithm of private and government consumption ratio, C t /G t , to the logarithm of their relative price P t g /P t c :
(1) ln(C t /G t ) ϭ ␣ ϩ ␤ ln(P t g /P t c ) ϩ u t where ln(C t /G t ) and ln(P t g /P t c ) are both difference-stationary I(1) processes, and u t is a stationary I(0) process. Formal statistical evidence for the cointegration property will be provided in the following. The slope parameter ␤ is the elasticity of substitution between private and government consumption. A positive (negative) ␤ means that the two goods are substitutes (complements). One attractive feature of cointegrating regression is that the slope parameters can be estimated consistently without the assumption that the regressors are econometrically exogenous. In equation (1), for example, ␤ can still be estimated consistently even though there may be stationary omitted variables or measurement errors.
So far equation (1) is treated as a pure statistical relationship between the consumption ratio of private and government goods and their relative prices. It is possible to provide the equation a structural interpretation by deriving it as an equilibrium condition, following the ideas of Ogaki (1992) , Ogaki and Park (1997) , and Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) . Assume that the representative consumer values two goods, private and government, according to an expected lifetime utility function subject to stationary preference shocks:
(ε t , t ) are random preference shocks that are assumed to be strictly stationary, have unit means, and finite variances. The stationarity assumption amounts to say preferences are stable in the long run. The period utility function is assumed to possess the usual properties uЈ Ͼ 0 and u Љ Ͻ 0. (, ) are preference parameters that characterize the representative agent's utility function: is the relative weight assigned to private goods and is the substitution parameter that measures the curvature of the indifference curves. Given time separability of the utility function, the optimal consumption bundle will have to satisfy the equality between marginal rate of substitution and relative price:
The Direct Substitution between Government and Private Consumption 47
Taking logarithm and rearranging yields
Stable preferences implies that the residual term, -σ ln( t /ε t ), is stationary and hence equation (5) should be a cointegrating regression, provided that log consumption ratio, ln(C t /G t ), and log price ratio, ln(P t g /P t c ), are both I(1) processes. In other words, the stable preferences assumption, together with the consumer optimality condition in equation (4), imposes a cointegration restriction on the movements of the log consumption ratio and the log price ratio series. Equation (5) provides a structural interpretation to equation (1), which can be regarded as the reduced-form equation with parameters and residuals related to their structural counterpart via the relationships
Notice that equation (5) is a theoretical demand equation, whereas equation (1) is an empirical equation describing the equilibrium quantities and prices. Just like the classical supply-and-demand simultaneous equation model, interpreting equation (1) as the demand equation requires identification assumption. In general, to identify the demand equation, we need variability from the supply side and the demand side should be relatively stable. Since the supply side has to do with production, which is subject to technological improvement, it is reasonable to expect the quantitysupplied series should be highly persistent, which can be modeled as a stochastic trend. The demand side, on the other hand, has to do with taste and it is reasonable to expect preference shocks are relatively stable in comparison with technological shocks. In the context of demand analysis, Ogaki (1992) has shown formally that the assumptions of stable preferences and a stochastic trend in the quantity supplied are sufficient to ensure identification of a cointegrating demand equation like equation (1).
In the theoretical analyses of Bailey (1971) and Barro (1981) , followed by the empirical work of Kormendi (1983) , Aschauer (1985) , and Evans and Karras (1996) , among many others, the effective consumption is specified as a weighted average of private and government consumption:
In this setup each unit of government goods is equivalent to units of private goods, irrespective of the current consumption level of the two goods. In other words, the indifference curves for the two goods are linear, which corresponds to the extreme case of ϭ ϩ ϱ in the CES aggregator function in equation (3). Clearly this is an empirically restrictive assumption, albeit a convenient one for analytical tractability. (2004), which in turn is based on the primitive data in the IMF Government Financial Statistics Yearbook. Total government outlays are comprised of government purchase of goods and services, wages and salaries for government employees, public capital investment, transfer payments, and interest payments of outstanding government debts. In terms of total outlays, the governments of the Asian countries are comparable in size to that of the United States, except for the Malaysia government, which stands out as the outlier of the group. The pattern of government expenditures among the Asian countries is more heterogeneous. Japan and Korea seem to differ from the rest of the Asian countries and their government expenditure patterns are broadly comparable to that of the United States. The governments of Hong Kong and the five ASEAN countries, on the other hand, spend relatively more on goods and services and on government employee payroll. Table 2 .1 also reveals that the Asian governments devote a considerable amount of resources on capital investments, presumably most are on public infrastructure and, for the five ASEAN countries, also on national enterprises. This is in sharp contrast to the United States in which public investment is only 1 percent of GDP. Among the heavy public investors, the Indonesian government
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The Direct Substitution between Government and Private Consumption 49 , Korea (1991-97) and Malaysia (1991-97) . b For Japan, the figure for goods and services and wages and salaries is the sum of the two components.
stands out as the largest by devoting 6.9 percent of GDP to public investment, followed by Thailand (6.5 percent), Singapore (5.0 percent), and Malaysia (4.8 percent). Another noteworthy component is transfer payments. The transfer payments of the Asian governments are all relatively low compared with the corresponding U.S. figure of 12.3 percent, with Japan and Korea registering the highest government transfers in the 8 to 9 percent range, and Thailand reporting the lowest transfers of only 1.3 percent of GDP. Clearly the low transfers in the ASEAN countries and Hong Kong reflect the relatively underdeveloped social security system and other formal welfare schemes.
Empirical Results
We use annual data for 1960 to 2002 from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2004) whenever possible to ensure crosscountry compatibility. Missing or erroneous entries are reconstructed from local sources. Private and government consumption are taken to be the relevant expenditure series from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The consumption ratio, C t /G t , is calculated from the constant price private and government consumption series. The two price series, P t g and P t c , are simply the respective implicit price deflators constructed by dividing the nominal series by the constant price counterpart.
We begin by examining the time series properties of the log consumption ratio series, ln(C t /G t ), and the log price ratio series, ln(P t g /P t c ). Figure 2 .1 depicts the two series for all nine Asian countries. The strong persistency and comovements of the two series are clearly discernable from the plots, giving an initial impression that they are likely to be I(1) and cointegrated. Table 2 .2 reports formal panel unit root test results. It is well known that unit root tests have low power and the problem may be even worse for our application as we have short time series. To better utilize sample information, we pool the nine countries' data to perform panel unit root tests, which have been shown to be more powerful than the individual time series version. All three panel unit root tests draw the same conclusion: the unit root null hypothesis is not rejected for the level series but is strongly rejected for the first differenced series. This shows that the log consumption ratio and the log price ratio series are indeed I(1). Moreover, the asymmetry of the p-values for the level series in the IPS test and the ADF-Fisher chi-square test suggest that log consumption ratio is the less integrated series-in the sense that it has a weaker random walk component-than the log price ratio. This has important implications to the specification of the cointegrating regression. It is well known that cointegrating regression is not invariant to normalization choice-deciding which variable to put on the left-hand side as the regressand-and different choices may imply dif-
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Yum K. Kwan ferent estimates for the same parameter. For example, instead of running regression equation (1), we could have run the reverse regression with the log price ratio normalized as the regressand to obtain an estimate of (1/␤). In finite sample the estimates from the direct and reverse regressions may be far from being reciprocal to each other and they can also have drastically different statistical properties. According to Ng and Perron (1997) , in the context of cointegrating regression, it is preferable to put the less integrated series as the regressand and the more integrated series as the regressor. Applying the Ng-Perron rule, this means that designating the log consumption ratio series as the regressand as in equation (1) is indeed the right choice.
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Fig. 2.1 Private and government consumption ratio and relative price
Notes: Solid ϭ log consumption ratio ln(C t /G t ); dashed ϭ log price ratio ln(P t g /P t c ). Table 2 .3 reports panel estimation results for equation (1) with countryspecific fixed effects. The cointegration property of equation (1) is confirmed by the two panel cointegration tests: the null hypothesis of no cointegration is decisively rejected by Kao's (1999) ADF test, but the null of cointegration cannot be rejected according to the McCoskey and Kao (1998) LM test. Turning to the elasticity of substitution between private and government consumption-the coefficient of ln(P t g /P t c )-it can be seen that the estimates are all significantly positive, ranging between 0.57 and 1.05 with small standard errors, and varying across different estimation methods and sample periods. The empirical results suggest that on average private and government consumption in East Asia are substitutes with an elasticity of substitution midway between 0.5 and 1.
We also estimate an unrestricted version of equation (1) as a simple specification check:
Equation (1) is a restricted version of equation (8) with ␤ 1 ϩ ␤ 2 ϭ 0. Estimates of ␤ 1 and ␤ 2 that are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign provide evidence in favor of the restriction and hence equation (1). As can be seen from table 2.3, the pattern of the parameter estimates is in general supportive of equation (1) Notes: Regressand = ln(C t /G t ). P-values are in square brackets. All regressions include country-specific fixed effect (unreported). DOLS = Kao and Chiang (2000) ticity of substitution ranging from 0.41 in Hong Kong to 0.65 in China. The Philippines, on the other hand, has a numerically small and statistically insignificant elasticity of substitution of 0.07, indicating little substitution in private and government consumption. Indonesia and Thailand provide an interesting case of contrast. The estimated elasticity of substitution between private and government consumption is -0.92 for Indonesia and 1.51 for Thailand. Government consumption is a strong substitute to private consumption in Thailand, implying that a fiscal contraction that makes government goods relatively more expensive will induce substantial expansion in private consumption, thereby offsetting or even outweighing the negative impact of the fiscal contraction on aggregate demand. The Indonesian government consumption, in contrast, is a strong complement to private consumption, implying that a fiscal contraction that makes government goods relatively more expensive will generate a large negative income effect that outweighs the substitution 54 Yum K. Kwan effect, leading to a concomitant contraction in private consumption expenditure that further depresses aggregate demand. These predictions about the two economies' reaction to fiscal austerity seem to be consistent with what have been observed during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. What explains the cross-country diversity in the substitution between private and government consumption? In their international study, Evans and Karras (1996) find a statistically significant negative relationship between the share of government expenditure that goes to national defense and the degree of substitutability between private and government consumption. The idea is that the higher is the defense share, the higher is the public goods component in government consumption, which reduces its ability to substitute for private consumption. In table 2.5 we collect together for the nine East Asian countries their national defense expenditure shares, education expenditure shares, and estimated elasticities of substitution between private and government consumption. The entries are sorted by the substitution elasticities for ease of comparison. Apparently neither the education share nor the defense share can explain the empirical pattern of the substitution elasticities for all nine countries. However, the correlation between the defense shares and substitution elasticities is -0.24, confirming the empirical findings of Evans and Karras (1996) . The strong complementarity between private and government consumption in Singapore seems to be testimonial to the Evans-Karras story, in view of the favorable international ratings of the Singaporean education system and other infrastructure, and the government's well-documented role in the country's economic success (e.g., Low 1998 and Krause, Tee, and Yuan 1987) . The case of Indonesia may appear to be defiant of the Evans-Karras The Direct Substitution between Government and Private Consumption 55 explanation: the expenditures on education and defense are only moderate and yet private and government consumption appear to be complements, according to the negative sign of the substitution elasticity. One potential explanation is the well-known fact that the Indonesian government heavily subsidizes the private sector, including fuel, electricity, fertilizer, and other basic goods, and these subsidies are complementary to other goods in the private-consumption bundle; see for example Hill (1996 Hill ( , 1999 and World Bank (2006) . When the Indonesian government adjusts these subsidies in tandem with the overall government spending, this will generate the observed comovements of private and government consumption that gives rise to the estimated negative elasticity of substitution.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have estimated the degree of substitution between private and government consumption in nine East Asian countries. On average there is substantial substitutability between private and government consumption, implying there will be direct crowding out of private consumption by government consumption. Such direct crowding-out effect will reinforce the conventional interest rate and wealth effect crowdingout channels to make fiscal policy relatively ineffective in East Asia. We also find that the substitutability between private and government consumption varies among the Asian countries. Government and private consumption turn out to be complements in Indonesia and Singapore, but they are substitutes in other Asian countries with different degrees of substitutability. There is no obvious quantitative variable that can explain each country's empirical estimates, although the share of government expenditure that goes to education and national defense seems to be negatively correlated with substitutability. Future study on this issue will need a more careful examination of each country's institutional details-one will have to understand what sort of government services those public-consumption figures represent-before further conclusion can be drawn.
